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Commentary: Central America, Which Way After The Cold
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by Guest
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Published: 1994-02-18
By William I. Robinson
[The piece is based on an address delivered by Robinson at a Feb. 10 symposium organized by
the Central America Peace Alliance, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. A former LADB news analyst,
Robinson is currently a research associate with the Managua-based International Studies Center
(Centro de Estudios Internacionales, CEI). The text was prepared during a recent visit to Central
America. Part two, an overview of recent events in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, will be
published in the 02/25/94 edition of NotiSur.]
It's been about four years since the Cold War symbolically ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall,
and almost four years to the day since the Cold War symbolically ended in Central America with
the defeat of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in the February 1990 elections. So
I think this is a good time to look back and analyze what's happened in Central America during
these past few years in order to get a better idea of what we might expect to see in the region during
the coming period. I'd like to make some general comments, some of which I suspect will be quite
polemic.
In a nutshell, I believe that recent events in the region have rendered inadequate some very basic
elements of the analytical framework which I and others have been using for the past several
years. Let me also stress at the outset that time constraints here preclude me from providing a full
exploration of the theoretical and analytical issues at hand. This is by necessity a simplification of
complex issues and concepts. To begin, let me briefly summarize the "old" analysis regarding the
outcome of the struggles which gripped Central America during the 1980s. First, according to this
analysis, by 1990 the old oligarchies in Central America had virtually disappeared. By the late 1980s
neither the popular forces nor their adversaries, the New Right in Central America together with the
United States, could prevail. In the broadest sense, the situation in the region was characterized as a
stalemate.
This stalemate, it was said, created the conditions for an historic compromise between different
class and social forces in favor of a mutual accommodation. This was widely interpreted as an
unprecedented modus vivendi in Central America. In this context, a broad consensus was reached
through negotiations and peace settlements that would in effect shift the terrain of struggle in
the region from the military to the political-civic arena. In turn, this shift was to be framed within
region-wide processes of democratization and demilitarization. According to this analysis, during
this post-Cold War and post-oligarchic period, competition between different social projects would
now take place through elections and peaceful mobilization.
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Under this analysis, what were to have been the main elements of the period between 1990 and the
present? First, there was to have been a process of far-reaching social and economic reconstruction
in Central America. Second, there was to be a new, less asymmetrical relation, between the Central
American countries and the United States, including positive contributions by the US. Third, there
were supposed to be spaces which would allow the left in Central America to compete on an equal
footing within a new environment in the civic and political terrain. Most important, in this new era,
real structural transformations and social change were to be not only possible, but desirable and
even necessary for consolidating peace. Taken together, all of these changes were to inaugurate a
new chapter in Central American history.
Nonetheless, I believe that many of us who have closely followed events in Central America over
the course of the past 15 years became swept up in some grossly mistaken notions in the wake
of the collapse of the old Soviet-style statist models of socialism, the worldwide crisis of the left,
the seeming omnipotence of the only remaining superpower, and the absolute hegemony of free
market, global capitalism. These mistaken notions led us to lose sight of a few basic elements that
haven't changed under this new world order, elements that I don't think are likely to change in the
near future, given current trends. Had I been asked six months or a year ago the same question we
are addressing today, "Central America: Which Way After the Cold War?", my response would
have largely revolved around the framework analysis of "stalemate" and "historic compromise"
as described above. Nonetheless, I now believe the situation merits a more thorough analysis, one
which would reflect the inadequacy of such a framework.
First, I would like to clarify that, as a sociologist who tries to look at things theoretically, then as
a journalist, trying to keep my feet firmly planted on the ground, and finally as a political activist
committed to social change and social justice in favor of popular majorities, I am convinced that
the analysis I will present here today, while pessimistic, is also realistic. I would also temper this
by adding that I am not totally pessimistic. To the contrary, a close examination of the situation
reveals there are reasons for both optimism and hope, which I will briefly discuss in my concluding
comments.
Specifically, I would like to address six basic points that underlie a new, evolving analysis of the
situation in Central America. First, neither imperialism, nor gross social and economic inequalities
both within nations and in the global system as a whole have disappeared. To the contrary,
they have become more entrenched and intensified. Concepts such as social class, imperialism,
exploitation, a critique of capitalism, etc., are not rhetorical anachronisms left over from the Cold
War. They are just as valid today as ever. In fact, I would argue that these concepts are essential for
understanding Central America in this post-Cold War period.
By the same token, in this new world order, global capitalism is not more benign than before. In
today's global economy, capitalism is less benign, less responsive to the interests of the broad
majorities around the world, and less accountable to society. Hegemonic transnational capital is
in fact savage for billions of people around the globe. To illustrate this reality, I'd like to cite some
statistics which were published in the introduction to a report released last year by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP). According to the report, the wealthiest 20% of humanity
receives 82.7% of the world's wealth. The richest 20% of the world's population also controls 80% of
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world trade, 95% of all loans, 80% of domestic savings, and 80.5% of world investments. In addition,
the wealthiest 20% of humanity consumes 70% of the world's energy, 75% of its metals, 85% of its
timber, and 60% of its food supply. The middle classes are tending to disappear, or at least shrink
drastically, since the 20% that could be called the world's middle class now only receives 11.7% of
the world's wealth.
Furthermore, the gap between the global rich and the global poor is becoming a gaping chasm,
growing at a rate unprecedented in modern human history. According to the UNDP, in 1960 the
richest 20% in the world had 30 times more wealth than the poorest 20%. But by 1990, the richest
20% had 150 times more wealth than the poorest 20%. The report also notes that 1.2 billion people
out of about 5 billion people who inhabit the planet now live in total indigence. An additional 100
million will join the ranks of the indigent each year during the 1990s. In this regard, Latin America is
the site of the most pronounced backward movement.
The UNDP report points out that the number of destitute people in Latin America went from 120
million in 1980 to nearly 200 million in 1990, out of a total population of about 400 million. Among
sub-regions in Latin America, the greatest backward movement has taken place in Central America.
Currently 80% of all Central Americans live below the poverty line, half of them in complete
destitution. So, under this unbridled global capitalism, we have witnessed the increasing division
of humanity into a well-off minority and an impoverished majority, with the gap between the two
accelerating at an unprecedented rate.
The current international order functions only to the extent that it maintains these structures
of inequality. In order to maintain these structures, an international elite has emerged which
represents transnational capital. Around the globe, this elite controls financial, economic, military
and cultural powers, as well as transnational communications and technological development.
Against this backdrop, my second point is that we must recognize and accept the existence of
antagonistic interests in Central America and internationally. No one should be fooled into thinking
that these interests are reconcilable. On the one hand, we have the so-called New Right, which
currently holds state power in each of the Central American republics. In the era of the global
economy, this New Right represents the interests of transnational capital. As the local contingents
of the transnational elite, this New Right is firmly supported by, and allied with, the United States
as the hegemonic power in the region. The social and economic project of this New Right is the
neoliberal project. On the other side are the broad popular majorities in Central America. In my
view, the interests of the majorities have not been and indeed cannot be met by the neoliberal
project. To the contrary, the neoliberal project has thrust millions of Central Americans not only
into a desperate social and economic situation, but into a virtual crisis of identity, a crisis of survival
where the daily struggle for existence has come to occupy centerstage.
The proponents of neoliberalism in Central America would like to have us believe that "you
can have your cake and eat it too." But you cannot have a transnational elite on the one hand
implementing and consolidating the neoliberal project, and at the same time talk about national
projects, about peace, reconciliation and harmony between this project and the broad majorities in
Central America.
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This leads to my third point: contrary to my own earlier analysis, and that of many other analysts
of Central American affairs, the revolutionary upheavals which swept the region beginning in
the late 1970s and running through 1991, did not end in a regional stalemate leading to a historic
compromise among social classes and political groups. Rather, I would characterize the outcome as
the conditional defeat of the broad popular sectors in Central America, and the conditional victory of
the old and new dominant groups. The latter includes elements of the old oligarchy, the New Right,
and the US as the hegemonic power, together representing what I've termed transnational capital,
the agent of the global economy.
Why do I refer to this as "conditional defeat" and "conditional victory?" "Conditional defeat"
because the popular forces did not go down in total defeat, they did not lose everything. They
still have active and reserve forces; their "last word" is not in yet. "Conditional victory" because
the dominant groups did not win anything close to a total victory nor did they get everything that
they wanted. They wanted a pliant population of 20 million poor Central Americans willing to
quiescently work themselves to death or resign themselves passively and silently to marginalization
and degradation. Why this change in my position, from a stalemate culminating in a "historic
compromise" to the defeat of the popular sectors and the victory of the dominant sectors?
This leads to point number four, perhaps the most crucial: during the entire period from the late
1970s to date, there have been no fundamental, structural changes in Central America. The only
exception was Nicaragua where, as we will see shortly, those changes are now in the process of
being rolled back. In other words, the very conditions which gave rise to the Central American
crisis in the first place remain, for the most part, unaltered. Not only are the structural roots of the
conflict still present, they have in fact been aggravated over the course of the past 15 years. These
structural conditions are, above all, the extreme concentration of economic resources, of wealth,
and of political power, in the hands of tiny minorities, side by side with the impoverishment and
powerlessness of a dispossessed majority.
To cite a few examples, there has been no land reform whatsoever in Guatemala, a predominantly
agrarian country with the most unequal land tenure system in the entire hemisphere. Nor has there
been any redistribution of wealth in Guatemala. There has been a cosmetic opening of the political
system, but no passing of real political power to the Guatemalan majority. There have been no
changes in the structures of the de facto apartheid system that keeps the country's Indian majority
in a position of ethnic and racial subordination. In neighboring Honduras, timid attempts at land
reform during the 1970s and 1980s were rolled back under the auspices of the neoliberal project in
the early 1990s. Nor has there been any redistribution of wealth or an authentic political opening.
Again, to the contrary, the neoliberal project has greatly exacerbated income inequality in the
country, while monopolization of the political process by the country's two main political parties
remains as entrenched as ever. El Salvador is a unique case, with the future of the social, economic
and political transformations envisioned as part of the peace accords still very much up in the
air. In part, implementation of those transformations will depend on what happens in next
month's elections. Nicaragua, of course, is also a case apart since there was a reorientation of
resources and of political power in favor of the poor majority during the Sandinista revolution.
But that reorientation is now being completely reversed. The country is undergoing a process of
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reconcentration of wealth and power in the hands of a tiny minority, parallel with the pauperization
of broad sectors of the population, a process which is advancing with dizzying speed.
So in all five Central American republics, including Costa Rica which I haven't mentioned,
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, we have a situation where property, wealth and
income have become more, not less, concentrated. The vast majority has become more, not less,
impoverished in each of the Central American countries. Throughout the South of our new global
society (as well as in the North I might point out) we see the growth of both wealth and poverty the
phenomenon of poverty amidst plenty but we see it with particular force in Central America. The
historical record clearly shows how profound and sustained structural inequalities generate social
conflict, polarization, and political instability. So if today we are seeing what looks like peace in
Central America, it is really something more akin to "latent war."
Central America is not living a peace process. Until and unless profound structural changes occur,
it is living a process of "latent war." I don't think we can talk about "conflict resolution" in Central
America because the conflict has not been resolved. Instead, we have moved from open conflict
to latent conflict, from open warfare to latent warfare, not to peace. In the absence of fundamental
structural change, all the peace accords, settlements, internationally supervised negotiations and
technically clean elections amount to little more than paper agreements, diplomatic back-patting,
and self- delusion.
The fifth point is that we need to be clear that the so- called transitions to democracy in Central
America which I had earlier analyzed as shifts in the political superstructures that would allow
social conflicts to be transferred from the military to the political and civic terrain have in fact
been shifts from authoritarianism and dictatorship to "low intensity democracies." Low intensity
democracy stands opposed to, or holds back, high intensity democracy. The latter would imply a real
redistribution of economic resources and of political power toward the broad majorities.
In Nicaragua, we see the one exception, with the shift from dictatorship under Somoza to high
intensity democracy under the Sandinista government, followed by a regression to low intensity
democracy from 1990 to the present. Authentic democracy means the participation of the broad
majorities in the vital decisions that affect their lives. It means political outcomes in the interests of
these majorities predicated on the construction of a democratic socio-economic system. This would
require a massive redistribution of political power in Central America. In turn, political power flows
from economic power, and economic power is based on control over society's resources, wealth, and
culture. In Central America, over the course of the past 15 years, resources, wealth, and culture have
been increasingly monopolized by tiny minorities. In this context, just how meaningful is it to talk
today about "transitions to democracy" in Central America?
The sixth and final point is that the current post-Cold War international system, characterized by the
global economy, from which no country or region can escape, makes the conditions less propitious,
less favorable now than at any time in recent history, for fundamental changes in Central America's
social and economic structures. In other words, the structural roots of the conflict persist, yet the
possibilities for addressing those structural roots are more remote now than they were during the
1980s. In concluding, I'd like to say that if my tone has been pessimistic, this has in some measure
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been deliberate because I feel it is important to counter the prevailing notions that there is a peace,
reconciliation, and reconstruction process harmoniously unfolding in Central America.
Nonetheless, all of the above does not preclude the existence at the same time of some very positive
and hopeful developments in Central America as well. I'd like to very briefly address just a couple
of these positive signs. First, there has been a revolution in civil society throughout Central America,
an awakening, agitation, and organizing, at the grassroots level. This revolution in civil society is
apart from, and independent of, organized left political parties.
In Nicaragua, the emergence of civil society constitutes one of the most hopeful and positive
signs. For example, the Nicaraguan womens' movement is perhaps the most vibrant in all of
Latin America. The trade union movement, the campesino movement, even the burgeoning
environmental movement, have all acquired new protagonism, independent of the political parties.
The second positive presage for the future of Central America are the increasing signs we have seen
pointing to the neoliberal project as a house of cards.
Perhaps the most vivid example of this is the recent uprising in Chiapas, an event which has real
and symbolic importance for all of the Americas. Mexico under the Salinas administration was
the showcase of neoliberal success. That showcase has been shattered, perhaps beyond repair,
by the events in Chiapas. Although Chiapas is the most graphic example of this phenomenon, it
is hardly unique or an isolated case. One needn't look too closely to see that varying degrees of
ungovernability characterize country after country throughout Latin America. I believe that these
political and social explosions are going to characterize the landscape in the region throughout the
remainder of the decade and into the 21st century. As far as Nicaragua and Central America are
concerned, the crisis and eventual collapse of the neoliberal project will, in my view, create regional
or transnational conditions and spaces through which to promote an alternative.
I would like to conclude on this final point. A Nicaraguan journalist recently described the situation
in the country on the eve of 1994 this way: "There is a time to laugh and a time to cry, says the Bible.
But there is also a time to protest, a time to wait for solutions or changes. And then, once again, a
time to protest. There is a time for the realignment of forces and a time for clear definitions." In
my view, this is a time for realignment, for clear definitions, and for protest. And the search for
alternatives constitutes our biggest responsibility at this point. Alternatives to the neoliberal project,
alternative viable forms of struggle from civil society, from the state, if and when state power is won
through elections or other means, and alternatives for us in the United States.

-- End --
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